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The advent of domestic bioterrorism has emphasized the need for enhanced detection of clusters of acute
illness. We describe a monitoring system operational in eastern Massachusetts, based on diagnoses
obtained from electronic records of ambulatory-care encounters. Within 24 hours, ambulatory and tele-
phone encounters recording patients with diagnoses of interest are identified and merged into major syn-
drome groups. Counts of new episodes of illness, rates calculated from health insurance records, and
estimates of the probability of observing at least this number of new episodes are reported for syndrome
surveillance. Census tracts with unusually large counts are identified by comparing observed with
expected syndrome frequencies. During 1996–1999, weekly counts of new cases of lower respiratory syn-
drome were highly correlated with weekly hospital admissions. This system complements emergency
room- and hospital-based surveillance by adding the capacity to rapidly identify clusters of illness, includ-
ing potential bioterrorism events. 
apid identification of unusual clusters of acute illness in
the general population is a fundamental challenge for
public health surveillance (1). Recent distribution of Bacillus
anthracis spores and the resulting occurrence of clinical dis-
ease (2) provide new impetus to developing and implementing
surveillance systems that can identify both bioterrorism events
and naturally occurring illness clusters, such as influenza and
waterborne disease. Recognizing individual cases of infection,
e.g., inhalational anthrax, requires astute and alert clinicians.
However, many potential biological agents of terrorism,
including anthrax, have nonspecific prodromal phases, and no
explicit diagnosis is ever made for many other syndromes of
potential importance. Recognizing these clusters at the earliest
possible opportunity will require well-designed surveillance
systems to ensure timely detection of unusual clusters of pro-
dromal, nonspecific illness.
Several projects have been developed specifically to pro-
vide improved surveillance for detecting bioterrorism in urban
populations (3). Some of these existing surveillance systems
operate in emergency departments and hospitals (4). While
these systems are very useful, implementation may be
impeded by the effort required for timely collection and analy-
sis of diagnosis data in a suitable format. Additionally, emer-
gency rooms and hospitals may see increased numbers of
cases days after the first, milder symptoms of disease bring
new patients to ambulatory-care settings. 
Surveillance systems based in ambulatory-care settings,
particularly those based on automated medical records, may
therefore provide worthwhile additional information. One of
the best-known such systems is the Department of Defense
Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of
Community-based Epidemics (ESSENCE) system (5), which
is based on encounter data from health services operated by
the Department of Defense. Another such system is operating
in Minnesota (6). Nurse hot lines have also been used for sur-
veillance purposes (7).
We describe here an automated system developed in a part-
nership between the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, a large
group practice, a health plan, and an academic department.
The system produces next-day information about illness clus-
ters, based on ambulatory-care visits and telephone calls. 
Methods
The utility of diagnoses from automated ambulatory
encounter data for detecting respiratory disease clusters has
been described (8). In this report, we extend the use of encoun-
ter data to produce daily surveillance summary reports cover-
ing a broad range of syndromes for use by public health
officials and health-care providers. 
The encounter data come from an electronic medical
record system used by Harvard Vanguard Medical Associates,
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a large multispecialty group practice, to record all ambulatory-
care encounters, including telephone contacts, regular visits,
and urgent-care encounters, but not emergency room visits.
The practice serves approximately 250,000 members, repre-
senting approximately 10% of the population of eastern Mas-
sachusetts.
The automated record system is a commercial product
(Epicare; Epic Systems Corporation, Madison, Wisconsin;
available from: URL: http://www.epicsys.com) used by many
large medical groups. It represents a valuable source of sur-
veillance data because it operates in real time (i.e., records are
updated as information is entered). Additionally, to the extent
that practices engage in some form of prepaid care, the popula-
tion served can be explicitly enumerated; the surveillance
report described below is restricted to approximately 175,000
members of Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, a principal health
maintenance organization in the region. These persons consti-
tute a defined population that receives essentially all its ambu-
latory care in this practice. Demographic information and
addresses are available for all these persons. At the time of
consultation, clinical diagnoses are assigned for each encoun-
ter by the clinician, who chooses from lists of terms on the
encounter screen; essentially all episodes are coded by the end
of the same day on which care is given. Although an unlimited
number of codes can be chosen, approximately 90% of
encounters have three or fewer codes assigned (8), stored as
ICD-9 codes. Each night, an extract is created of all encounters
recorded in the previous 24 hours with any of >1,500 ICD-9
codes in any of the syndrome categories. The patient's temper-
ature is also recorded along with the ICD-9 codes. Demo-
graphic data are merged with each record through a link to the
patient’s membership record. 
As a way of grouping insured persons into neighborhoods,
the addresses of the insured plan members, obtained from the
HMO's data, have been coded by Geographic Information Sys-
tem (Mapping Analytics, Rochester, NY) to determine the cen-
sus tracts of their residences (9,10).
Developing and Defining Syndromes
Patient encounters are categorized into syndrome groups
according to the ICD-9 codes assigned at the time of consulta-
tion. The surveillance software considers each encounter
record in turn and merges related ICD-9 diagnosis codes into
syndrome groups by using a modification of a provisional
classification scheme developed as part of the ESSENCE
project (5). This scheme reduces the complexity of the ICD-9
into eight syndrome categories: coma/shock, neurologic, upper
gastrointestinal, lower gastrointestinal, upper respiratory,
lower respiratory, dermatologic, and sepsis/fever. We made
two major modifications of the syndrome definitions: the num-
ber of ambulatory episodes in the coma/shock category was
almost zero in 4 years of data we examined, so it was com-
bined with the neurologic syndrome category. A new syndro-
mic category representing diagnoses of Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) bioterrorism category A agents
(11) (anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia, and hem-
orrhagic fever) is reported separately. We also added an addi-
tional influenza-like illness category, defined by the CDC
sentinel surveillance definition of fever >37.8oC measured in
the office plus cough and/or sore throat in the absence of a
known cause (12). 
An individual patient may have multiple encounters asso-
ciated with a single episode of illness (e.g., initial consultation,
consultation 1–2 days later for laboratory results, and follow-
up consultation a few weeks later) (8). To avoid double count-
ing from this common pattern of ambulatory care, the first
encounter for each patient within any single syndrome group is
reported, but subsequent encounters with the same syndrome
are not reported as new episodes until >6 weeks has elapsed
since the most recent encounter in the same syndrome. We
have reported that grouping respiratory illness visits into epi-
sodes reduces the total number of events by 38% in this clini-
cal setting (8). This practice of grouping clinical encounters
into episodes of illness occurs independently for different syn-
dromes. For example, a patient could qualify for two different
syndromes on a single visit if codes for cough (lower respira-
tory syndrome) and diarrhea (lower gastrointestinal syndrome)
are assigned at the same visit; or a lower gastrointestinal syn-
drome episode could begin a few days after the start of a lower
respiratory syndrome episode. 
Reporting Results
A daily surveillance summary report (Tables 1 and 2; Fig-
ure 1) was designed in collaboration with staff from the Mas-
sachusetts Department of Public Health and the medical
group's administration, which has operated since it was imple-
mented on October 25, 2001. The aim of the report was to
identify any unusually large numbers of episodes of illness
within the ambulatory-care system. The current version (Table
1) shows new episode counts and rates (per 1,000 insured per-
sons) for all syndromes combined and for each individual syn-
drome, during the previous day. Mean rates are presented for
the same day of the week in the same month of the previous 2
years, as well as the statistical probability associated with
these counts derived from a generalized linear mixed model
(described in the Models and Analysis section) for the four
most common syndromes. 
Each day's report also includes a list and maps of the resi-
dence locations of cases with respiratory and gastrointestinal
syndromes (Tables 1 and 2; Figure 1). The list and the map
both show the five census tracts in the region with the most
improbably large number of new episodes, based on the statis-
tical model described. Daily updates are disseminated to
authorized persons through a password-protected area on a
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) (13,14) encrypted website.
Models and Analysis
For each syndrome, we used a generalized linear mixed
model (GLMM) (15–17) to model the daily counts from local
neighborhoods over a 4-year historical period. In our model,Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 8, August 2002 755
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census tracts (CT) form the neighborhoods, but this unit can be
extended easily to larger or smaller geographic units if desired.
Sample SAS code is provided in Appendix 1. The model
closely resembles logistic regression, so that the logit,
log(Pr(yi = 1) / Pr(yi = 0)), is modeled as a linear function of
some covariates: ß0 + x1i ß1 + x2i ß2 + ...  where i indexes units
of analysis, x1i and  x2i are covariates or predictors, and Pr(yi =
1) is often denoted as pi. In the GLMM version of logistic
regression, E(yit | bi) = nit pit and logit(pit) = xit ß + bi where yit
is the binomial-distributed number of visits in CT i on day t, nit
is the number of members living in that CT on that day, pit is
the probability that any patient has had a visit with a diagnosis
in the syndrome, xit is a set of covariates measured on CT i at
time t, ß is a vector of fixed effects, and bi is a random effect
distributed with mean 0 and variance     . The model can be
used to generate an estimate of pit by inverting the logit. 
In the model now in use, we include in xit an intercept, an
indicator for 6 days of the week, indicators for 11 months of
the year, an indicator of the day as regular or a national holi-
day, and a linear term for the secular time trend. In each case,
the terms contribute significantly to the fit of the model (p
<0.0001). The estimates from the model have face validity: the
estimated odds of visits for lower respiratory infections are
higher in winter months than summer, higher on weekdays
than on the weekend, and smaller on national holidays. The
test that      = 0 tests the null hypothesis that all the census
tracts are the same, meaning that pit = pjt , for all CT i and j.
This test is rejected (p <0.0001).
For example, suppose that the estimated intercept was –8,
the estimated effect for April was –0.6, and the estimated
effect for Monday was –0.5. Finally, if we are interested in
finding pit for a given day in April in a CT with an estimated bi
of 1.1, we omit the secular time trend for simplicity. The esti-
mated pit ,   it , for any Monday in April in that CT is
The models are applied at the CT level to estimate the
period of observation required to expect one count at least as
high as those observed in each CT for each syndrome, after the
data were adjusted for day of week, holidays, season, secular
trend, and the unique characteristics of each CT. This period is
also corrected to reflect the fact that each CT is considered on
each day. The reported period is the inverse of the expected
number of counts this extreme in a day, where 529 tests are
performed each day. This is 529* where the last figure is the
probability under the model that as many or more cases than
were observed on that day will be observed in CT, calculated
from the binomial distribution function with p = pit  and n =
nit. The surveillance report (Table 2) shows the five CTs with
the longest required period derived from the model, plus all
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Table 1. Daily public health surveillance report of office visits with diagnoses corresponding to infection syndromes: summary report for Monday, 
March 4, 2002, Massachusetts
Syndrome
Rate/1,000 health plan 
members (no. of visits)a Probabilityb
1999 average rates for this 
weekday in the same month
2000 average rates for this 
weekday in the same month
All combined 2.015 (328) 1.918 2.123
Upper respiratory  1.087 (177) 0.999 1.151 1.251
Lower respiratory 0.405 (66) 0.999 0.369 0.474
Upper gastrointestinal 0.166 (27) 0.999 0.094 0.110
Lower gastrointestinal 0.227 (37) 0.999 0.221 0.173
CNS/neurologicc 0.000 (0) 0.003 0.007
Dermatologic 0.012 (2) 0.023 0.022
Sepsis/fever 0.000 (0) 0.057 0.086
Influenza-like illness 0.117 (19) — —
CDC bioterrorism category A agentsd 0.000 (0) 0 0
a Excludes individuals’ repeated visits within 6 weeks for the same syndrome.
bProbability of at least this many episodes occurring at least once per year, when the data are adjusted for month, day of week, holidays, secular trend, and variability among census 
tracts
cCNS, central nervous system; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
dAnthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia, and hemorrhagic fever.
Table 2. Lower respiratory syndrome by census tract, Massachusetts: 









No. of days between 
counts this extremeb
Randolph 250214202 4 1,232 1
Brookline 250214006 2 730 1
Boston 250250902 1 136 1
Somerville 250173507 2 918 1
Boston 250250304 1 225 1
aNo census tract had an unusual number of new lower respiratory syndrome episodes on 
that day. The five most extreme tracts are shown, plus all with counts not expected to 
occur more than once per month. Tracts with most extreme counts are compared with 
their own history.
bEstimated number of days between counts this extreme in any of the 529 census tracts, 
when data are adjusted for this tract's unique characteristics, as well as month, day of 
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often. We present the model in this fashion so that large num-
bers are unusual, rather than the smaller-is-more-unusual for-
mat of the p-value. In addition, this format has the advantage
of being measured in the time scale rather than the probability
scale. A map of eastern Massachusetts shows the spatial rela-
tionship between CTs highlighted each day (Figure 1).
We also used the model to generate the probability that a
count as large or larger than the observed count would be seen
over the whole surveillance area, after adjusting for day of
week, holidays, season, and census tract variation. This adjust-
ment is done by the same process as for the individual tracts
except that the random effects are omitted. These values are
also then adjusted on a yearly basis to account for the fact that
the probabilities are estimated every day. This estimate is sim-
ply the probability that a count as or more extreme as the
observed one would be observed in 365 days. All the statistical
processing uses automated SAS (18) programs. The web inter-
face was developed by using the Zope web application plat-
form (19), which runs a Python (20) program to rewrite the
SAS output files as linked web pages.
Validation
In the absence of known bioterrorism events, one way of
validating the surveillance system is to compare the relation-
ship between the substantial seasonal changes in disease inci-
dence known to occur in the ambulatory-care setting (8) to the
seasonal pattern in a reliable and independent source of data
such as the hospital system. The lower respiratory syndrome
includes a range of diseases (8) commonly associated with
admission for an acute illness after a variable prodrome, so
this syndrome was chosen for comparison. 
Health plan membership is not uniformly distributed
throughout the population of Massachusetts (Figure 2). One
hundred twenty zip codes were identified in which >100 lower
respiratory syndrome episodes were identified in health plan
members during 1996–1999; these cases accounted for
approximately 70% of all ambulatory lower respiratory syn-
drome episodes recorded in health plan members. 
The weekly numbers of these episodes in health plan mem-
bers were compared with weekly hospital admissions for all
residents (not limited to health plan members) of the same 120
zip codes. Hospital admission data with personal identifiers
removed were obtained from the Massachusetts Division of
Health Care Finance and Policy for the 3 years ending Septem-
ber 30, 1999. These records included only patients discharged
from the hospital, so the final 3 weeks of the hospital admis-
sion data were truncated to minimize the “edge effect” from
the period when patients may have been admitted but not yet
discharged and thus were not included in the available data.
Using the same procedure to group hospital discharge
ICD-9 codes as was used for the ambulatory data, we identi-
fied all admissions from residents of the 120 zip codes who
had a discharge diagnosis in the lower respiratory syndrome
group. Hospitalizations were assigned to the date of admis-
sion. We compiled the number of ambulatory lower respiratory
syndrome episodes and the number of hospital admissions for
lower respiratory syndrome for each week for the 3 years end-
ing September 30, 1999. Time-series plots were prepared to
compare seasonal patterns in the two independent data
sources, and Spearman rank correlations were calculated
between weekly hospital admission counts and ambulatory
care episodes in the same week, the previous week, and so on
up to 6 weeks, by using SAS Proc CORR (18). 
Results
Data from an example of the summary report, one of the
syndrome census tract reports, and the corresponding map for
March 4, 2002, are shown in Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1,
respectively. The overall counts were all well within model-
based expectations for this time of year, so the associated
probabilities were all close to 1; at the level of census tracts,
Figure 1. Map of sample small area syndrome counts for Monday,
March 4, 2002, showing the five census tracts with the most extreme
probability values. Labels show name of town, census tract code (state
and county prefixes have been removed), and number of cases for the
24 hours included in the report.
Figure 2. Health plan membership by census tract in eastern Boston.
Each census tract contains approximately 4,000 residents.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 8, August 2002 757
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all counts are common enough to be expected daily. Figure 3
shows daily rates of new episodes of influenza-like illness and
lower respiratory syndromes. Day-to-day variation is marked,
especially on weekends, as is the expected winter increase in
rates. Holidays such as New Year’s Day have the lowest rates
of reported illness.
The sensitivity of the statistical model in the face of this
extreme day-to-day and seasonal variation is illustrated in
Table 3. As few as three cases among health plan members
may constitute an event predicted by the GLMM to occur less
often than once per year, depending on the day of week and the
month of the year. 
Visual inspection of the weekly counts of episodes in the
ambulatory setting compared with hospital admissions shows
congruent patterns, including pronounced winter peaks (Figure
4). The data for admissions appear to lag behind data for
ambulatory-care visits, most obviously for the winters of 1997
and 1999. Overall, weekly ambulatory-care episodes for lower
respiratory illness were highly correlated with hospital admis-
sions over the 3 years examined. The Spearman rank correla-
tion between hospital admissions and ambulatory-care visits
during the same week was 0.89. Correlating hospital admis-
sions with ambulatory encounters from the previous week
yielded a value of 0.90. Repeating this analysis, increasing the
lag by 1 week at a time up to 6 weeks, yielded correlations of
0.92 at 2 weeks, 0.89 at 3 weeks, 0.85 at 4 weeks, 0.80 at 5
weeks, and 0.76 at 6 weeks. 
Discussion
The approach we have taken in the syndrome reporting
system is to try to maximize the probability that any “signal”
from the earliest stages of a bioterrorism or other public health
event can be detected above the “noise” of normal clinical
practice. The principal value of a syndromic surveillance sys-
tem like the one described here is its ability to identify clusters
of illness manifest by an unusual number of events, none of
which individually differs appreciably from common respira-
tory, gastrointestinal, or other illnesses. Such nonspecific pre-
sentations might be the first sign of a widespread bioterrorism
attack. They may also be the only routinely available clinical
evidence of other important illness clusters, such as influenza
or cryptosporidiosis, for which specific diagnostic tests are
typically not performed. Even commonly available tests, such
as x-rays, leukocyte counts, and sputum cultures are often not
performed for lower respiratory illness with fever in an other-
wise healthy patient, so syndromic surveillance can comple-
ment surveillance for individual cases of severe or
unanticipated illness, which depend on detailed information
about history, signs, symptoms, and diagnostic testing. Both
syndromic and disease-specific surveillance systems are
important components of any complete public health system.
To provide the best possible opportunities for effective
intervention, an ideal surveillance system should gather
timely, valid, and inexpensive data from a sufficiently large
proportion of the population to detect events of interest in the
region, and then process and present it to public health person-
nel in a form that enables efficient decision making. Important
elements of such a syndromic surveillance system exist in the
automated data generated by health plans and other parts of the
health-care delivery system as part of routine operations. The
system described here meets many of these criteria because it
results from collaboration between academic investigators,
health-care providers, and public health officials.
The automated medical records used here are well suited
for surveillance of ambulatory-care encounters because the
system is deeply integrated into the daily work of all clinicians
and it is linked to both the provider payment and the member-
ship systems. Although the data used in this system originate
in a complete electronic medical record system, most of the
syndromes are defined by diagnosis codes that are also avail-
able in other automated systems, including nurse hot lines and
increasingly common same-day financial claims processing
systems. Thus, several different kinds of data sources could
contribute to an integrated surveillance network. 
Time-series plots (Figure 4) provide some evidence that
the data have validity as a measure of illness in the commu-
nity, since the seasonal pattern is similar to that of indepen-
dently collected and validated hospital admission records for
Figure 3. Daily incidence rates of lower
respiratory and influenza-like illness after
December 17, 2001, showing that within-
week variation is substantially greater than
seasonal variation.RESEARCH
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the same geographic region. The highest correlation, 0.92 at 2
weeks lag, implies that up to 85% of the variability of weekly
hospital admission rates is predicted by variation in ambula-
tory-care admission levels 2 weeks earlier. 
Although the principal focus of this system is identifying
unusual patterns of apparently common conditions, it also
ensures prompt reporting of any encounter with a diagnosis
suggestive of a CDC category A bioterrorism agent. In prac-
tice, any clinician making one of these diagnoses would be
likely to report such a case separately, but there is almost no
marginal cost to implement or run this additional surveillance
component. 
The unadjusted counts and rates for each syndrome (Table
1) may be most useful in responding to a very large and wide-
spread bioterrorism event or identifying expected events such
as the advent of influenza in a community. In these cases, sta-
tistical refinement is unnecessary because those monitoring
the system will see substantially elevated rates. We believe sta-
tistical inference will be most useful when the signal from an
event is weak or restricted to a small geographic region. Many
syndromes have large seasonal fluctuations, such as the well-
known winter peak for lower respiratory disease. Individual
census tracts also show substantial variability in daily syn-
drome episode rates, possibly associated with demographic
and socioeconomic differences. The statistical model adjusts
daily expectations to account for important sources of varia-
tion, so those parts of the report based on statistical models
take large "expected" seasonal increases in illness into account
(e.g., Figure 4). The sensitivity of the resulting system (Tables
1 and 2) in the face of expected variability appears to be much
higher than more commonly advocated time-series based ana-
lytic approaches for public health surveillance (21). 
Daily counts for each syndrome within single census tracts
are usually zero, and as few as three to five health plan mem-
bers affected would be unusual in a typical tract, depending on
the month and day of week (Tables 1 and 2). To allow a rapid
assessment of the distribution of illness in the region, we high-
light the five extreme census tract counts for each syndrome in
our daily reports, even though there is nothing unusual in any
census tract on most days. An alerting system could easily be
triggered when there is a sufficiently unusual cluster for any
syndrome. The thresholds can be different for different syn-
dromes, and they can be adjusted to accommodate any desired
frequency of alerts. For example, in the absence of a period of
heightened alert, public health authorities may wish to be noti-
fied when the daily count of syndrome episodes within any
census tract attains a level that would only be expected to
occur within the entire catchment area once every three or
more months. Thus, users will be able to adjust the notification
system to suit their needs in terms of the preferred balance of
false-positive alerts against the risk of false negatives (no alert
in the presence of an actual event of interest). This kind of
information, which is being developed as part of this project,
could be a useful supplementary source for other public health
surveillance systems.
This reporting system includes strong protections of the
privacy of individual patients’ health records, since routine
reports contain only aggregated information. Existing clinical
and administrative security protocols that control statutory or
other authorized access to confidential patient data will apply
when follow-up is requested by public health authorities.
One advantage of this system is that it takes advantage of
the experience of ambulatory-care clinicians, who are likely to
be among the first to encounter patients during the prodrome
of any potential bioterrorism-related or other acute illness. In
addition, the system imposes no additional reporting burden
on clinicians, thus ensuring unbiased ascertainment of syn-
Table 3. Number of episodes of lower respiratory syndrome that would 
be expected to occur only once a month and once a year, based on a 
generalized linear mixed model (GLMM), in a representative eastern 
Massachusetts census tracta 
Month Day of week
No. needed for once 
per month event
No. needed for once 
per year event
January Monday 5 6
January Tuesday 5 6
January Wednesday 5 6
January Thursday 5 6
January Friday 5 5
January Saturday 4 4
January Sunday 4 4
April Monday 4 5
April Tuesday 4 5
April Wednesday 4 5
April Thursday 4 5
April Friday 4 5
April Saturday 3 4
April Sunday 3 4
July Monday 4 5
July Tuesday 4 4
July Wednesday 4 4
July Thursday 4 4
July Friday 4 4
July Saturday 3 4
July Sunday 3 4
October Monday 5 6
October Tuesday 4 5
October Wednesday 4 5
October Thursday 4 5
October Friday 4 5
October Saturday 4 4
October Sunday 4 4
aThis census tract has 491 health plan members and a random effect of 0.083, illustrat-
ing the effect of day of week and month of year for 2002.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 8, August 2002 759
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dromes of interest that come to the attention of the practice.
The data used here are already being gathered as part of the
day-to-day practice of all participating clinicians. There is an
initial cost for a system of this type because obtaining the data
in a suitable form requires initial programming and testing, but
subsequent processing requires relatively little additional
expenditure and adds substantial value. All the technology
used is widely available and inexpensive.
While any simplification inevitably hides some potentially
important detail, we believe that in addition to making the
reports more comprehensible, grouping the ICD-9 codes
decreases the impact of variation in coding practices. This
effect is particularly important since the earliest manifestations
of an outbreak may be nonspecific. The fact that syndromic
surveillance focuses on unusual counts of common events
means that detection of a signal may not be greatly influenced
by intensity of diagnostic testing performed, completeness of
documentation in the medical record, or variation between
physicians or health-care systems in the use of diagnostic ter-
minology or assignment of ICD-9 codes. For example, we
have shown that >90% of lower respiratory illness episodes
are represented by only three of the 119 ICD-9 diagnosis codes
included in the lower respiratory illness syndrome (8). As new
ICD coding schemes are adopted, changes to the mapping
used to translate code into syndrome will be required, but vari-
ation among tens of thousands of discrete individual codes is
unlikely to have any major impact at the level of the broad
syndromes used in our system.
This emphasis on broad groupings of diagnoses also sup-
ports the notion that different data sources, including auto-
mated medical records, nurse call centers, and transaction data,
might be combined into an integrated surveillance system.
Because the focus is on the acute illness that prompts a medi-
cal encounter, we expect that the performance characteristics
will not be seriously affected by differences between auto-
mated data systems, for instance, in the number of diagnoses
captured or in the method of assigning diagnosis codes. How-
ever, experience with additional systems will be required to
elucidate these issues. To the extent that different systems
yield similar discrimination of events of interest, it will be pos-
sible to integrate them at the regional level, to improve overall
sensitivity, and at the national level, to allow coherent surveil-
lance of the entire population.
While many types of data systems can contribute valuable
surveillance information, appreciating the added value of more
sophisticated data sources is also important. For instance, the
availability of temperatures in the automated medical record
system described here allows automated surveillance for influ-
enza-like illness. The availability of automated laboratory test
results and free text also provides opportunities to detect a
wider array of conditions and to improve the specificity of
detection of acute illness clusters. For example, anthrax sur-
veillance might be limited to patients with fever and a lower
respiratory illness syndrome.
An additional noteworthy feature of surveillance systems
such as this one is the fact that they need not cover the entire
population to identify at least some clusters of interest. The
minimum proportion of the population that must be under sur-
veillance to detect clusters of different sizes has not been
determined, but our coverage of 5%–10% of the population of
the region appears to provide useful information. Although a
small fraction of ambulatory-care practices uses automated
medical records, the effective population that would be cov-
ered by surveillance systems based on these automated records
is substantial, including many of the major population centers
in the country. Combining information from these sites with
other information sources, such as those maintained by health
plans or by hospitals, would rapidly provide at least some
monitoring capability for a much larger overall population. 
We can suggest additional methods for supplementing a
surveillance system that counts syndromes encountered in
ambulatory-care visits. Other sources of data, such as school
and work absenteeism, over-the-counter medication sales, and
even sales of products such as facial tissues and orange juice
might contain potentially useful surveillance information.
However, whether such data can be cheaply and efficiently
gathered and processed and whether the data will yield valid
and worthwhile signals remain to be demonstrated.
Many aspects of the current system will be improved with
experience. The development of standardized grouping of ICD
codes into syndromes is a priority to allow uniform reporting.
A great deal of work remains in developing statistical methods
capable of detecting different types of illness clusters, ranging
from acute, localized increases (for instance, due to release of
a toxic chemical agent) to more slowly emerging, widespread
conditions, as might be expected from contamination of a
water supply. The implementation described here demon-
Figure 4. Weekly total ambulatory-care episodes of lower respiratory
syndrome (broken line) and hospital admissions for lower respiratory
syndrome (solid line) in Massachusetts for the 3 years from September
9, 1996, through September 9, 1999. The eligible population for the
hospital data was the entire population of each zip code; the ambula-
tory care data came from a variable subset of each zip code. As a
result, the number of hospital admissions was higher than the number
of ambulatory-care episodes for parts of the period shown.RESEARCH
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strates that existing electronic data developed in the course of
routine medical care by a wide array of providers and health
plans can yield substantial improvements in current public
health capabilities for assessment of bioterrorism and other
acute illness clusters. 
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Appendix 1
We used this SAS code in fitting the generalized linear mixed
model (GLMM) that generates the parameter estimates used in our
reports. This SAS code relies on the GLIMMIX macro (17), which
has been distributed by SAS (18) since version 6.12.
%glimmix (  
data=test,
procopt= noclprint covtest ,
stmts=%str(class tract month dayofweek;
model lri/pop=month dayofweek holiday day;
random int/subject=tract solution type=un;),
error=binomial);
The data set is structured to contain a row for each day in the his-
torical period for each census tract. In the code, lri is the variable that
contains the count for census tract tract on day day. Pop contains the
number of subjects in the tract on that day. Month is the month of the
day, dayofweek is the day of week of the day, and holiday indicates
whether the day is a national holiday. Days are standardized to pre-
vent numerical difficulties with computation.
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